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Introduction
Could a government intervention turn around a bear market? Or could a government intervention rebuild institutional confidence in a bear market and consequently change institutional trading strategy? Answers to those questions have begun to accumulate over the last several years, but the sum conclusion is still unclear. Many economists believe that government intervention plays an important role in reducing stock market volatility by enforcing new rules, whereas opponents believe that government intervention creates inefficiency in the stock market.
Official governmental intervention in the stock market is relatively rare, unlike in the foreign-exchange markets. Even during a crash, governments of developed countries generally prefer to affect their stock markets by indirectly adjusting interest rates. In some emerging markets, however, the practice is different. For example, in China, a country in which the stock market is an experiment that blends a market economy with central plan- The parent SOEs are controlling shareholders that hold the nonpublic, nontradable shares of listed firms, whereas the minority shareholders hold tradable shares (in the wake of initial public offerings). Nontradable shares can only be bought and sold through negotiations or auctions with special approval from the government. Because tradable and nontradable stocks have the same voting rights but different prices, the Chinese government attempted to convert nontradable shares to tradable shares by implementing SSSR. However, if all nontradable stocks became tradable, the number of shares outstanding would increase by three times and investors would consequently face tough liquidity problems because of insufficient money supply in China's stock market. Table 2 ). In order to rebuild investors' confidence, China's State Council (the country's highest governing body) sent another intervention signal to the market in February 2004 by implementing a series of new regulations that encouraged foreign institutional investment (increasing the supply of investment to the stock market), adjusted stamp taxes, and controlled the magnitude of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in order to move stock prices upwards (see Table 2 ). This regulation, known as Guo Jiu Tiao or "the 2004 Regulation," has been considered the most important regulation in the history of the Chinese stock market. HK$118 billion worth of shares in the 33 Hang Seng stocks that accounted for more than 75% of the market trading volume. Su, Yip, and Wong (2002) find that the 1998 HK government intervention had a significant and positive impact on the stock market, as the intervention reversed the declining market trend and stabilized the volatile market. Bhanot and Kadapakkam (2006) attributed such an impact to "information effects associated with a credible signal from the government," rather than temporary or permanent price-pressure strengthens the argument that China's government intervention was effective and is consistent with information effects associated with intervention (Bhanot and Kadapakkam, 2006; Miller et al., 2002) . We also observe that institutions did change their trading behavior on large "market-up" days after the initial enactment of the 2004 Regulation.
Another important attribute of this study is its investigation of institutional trading strategy during large market-movement days, which may be influenced by the lack of liquidity in China's stock market. China's fund institutions hold a large amount of liquid assets, but the proportion of tradable shares is relatively limited. For instance, at the end of 2006 nearly 40% of all shares were tradable, whereas the rest were nontradable and held by the state in China (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2007) . This inconsistency enhances the liquidity problem for fund institutions.
Futhermore, the development of China's institutions is extremely imbalanced because funds constitute a majority of all institutions (see Section II). As a result, fund institutions have to compete against individual investors. Individual investors trade frequently because they lack professional experience and have short-term investment horizons, thereby causing more liquidity problems for fund institutions. For example, if fund institutions make a large purchase of a particular stock, this will motivate individual investors to buy the stock as well, consequently pushing the stock price up (this holds true when institutions sell large positions as well). This relationship is consistent with Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) , who find that stock prices are more synchronous in emerging countries than in developed countries; in the study, China ranks second behind only Poland for relative synchronicity in low-income economies. To take advantage of such a phenomenon, fund insti-tutions hide their real trading goals by slowly buying (or selling) a stock in order to induce individual investors to follow their trading direction first. Then, using the liquidity provided by individual trading, institutions change directions by selling (or buying) large volumes of stock, thereby creating market volatility. On those extreme days, large buying/selling transactions reflect institutions' true trading intentions. Hence, it is essential to investigate institutional trading on those "large market-movement" days, as they reflect institutions' actual reactions to new regulatory policies.
In this study, a volatile market is defined as a market whose absolute value of return is 3% or more. 3 To our knowledge, only two studies have been conducted on large market-movement days. The first study, conducted by Dennis and Strickland (2002) , finds that institutional trading contributes to market volatility, whereas the second paper, Lipson and Puckett (2007) , showed that institutional trading stabilizes volatile markets. We believe such contradictory findings could be attributed to one missing factor: underlying market conditions. Neither study separated bearish markets from bullish markets in their sample periods. Thus, this study also contributes to recent literature by explaining the mixed findings from prior studies.
This paper aims to facilitate a better understanding of government intervention and institutional trading strategy in several ways. First, this study documents that government intervention plays an active and essential role in investors' expectations about the future performance of publicly listed firms. In particular, the 2004 Regulation had an optimistic and positive impact on institutional trading. In brief, we find that the 2004 government intervention was effective after the information signal was sent to fund institutions, because those institutions are more rational than individual investors and are better equipped with more professional expertise (Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Sias, 1996) . Second, we find that the role of institutional trading varies significantly between the preintervention period (2001) (2002) (2003) Regulation. This relationship between institutional trading and market volatility also helps 3 The 3% cutoff is not arbitrary. Based on the method used in Dennis and Strickland (2002) , we calculate the mean and standard deviations of daily returns for the value-weighted portfolios of all listed corporations in China (including those on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges) from 2001 to 2006 and selected days with returns that were two standard deviations above or below the mean. The cutoff corresponded to the days when the returns were roughly 3% above or below the daily mean during 2001-2006.
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Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/ 2012 9 to explain the mixed findings in prior studies (Dennis and Strickland, 2002; Lipson and Puckett, 2007) . Finally, the difference in market perception and reaction to the same regulatory signal between institutions and individuals (the majority of China's stock market participants) was pronounced. Institutions focused more on the long-term impact of government intervention, whereas individuals were more interested in their short-term profits.
This is consistent with the notion that institutions are more sophisticated and better informed than individual investors (e.g., Szewczyk et al., 1992; Alangar et al., 1999; Bartov et al., 2000; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Sias, 1996) .
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides a detailed review of China's institutions. The background on China's government intervention and market condition is introduced in Section III, along with our hypothesis development. Section IV provides a description of the data sets used for this study, and a discussion of our empirical findings appears in Section V. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusions and limitations of this research. dramatically: total net asset value of funds reached RMB 856 billion ($124 billion at 6.9 RMB = U.S. $1) at the end of 2006 (see Figure 1 ). decade; in fact, they are becoming more popular than closed-end funds (see Table 1D ).
Currently there is no tough competition among institutions, because the composition of institutions is extremely imbalanced. There is no doubt that fund institutions are the 
Government interventions
According to the efficient-market hypothesis, a stock market reflects economic conditions 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 stance, Wang (2000) and Huang (2004) report that the market index in China departs from the country's GDP trend, and that the correlation between macroeconomic factors and stock market movements is rather low. This has led to government intervention in China's stock market. In addition, ample evidence exists that large price swings in the stock market often occur around the issuance of new security rules. The initial action of Gou Jiu Tiao to create small-and medium-size enterprise boards, begins.
Positive and encouraging August 30, 2004 China temporarily prohibits IPOs and other refinancing activities (in order to reduce the supply of shares outstanding), which helps to delay drops in stock prices.
Positive and encouraging September 10, 2004
Chinese Prime Minister Jia Bao Wen emphasizes Gou Jiu Tiao's protection of small investors' interests and the stabilization of the stock market.
Positive and encouraging October 18, 2004
China's central bank issues "How to manage short-term financing activities for security companies," which allows security companies to issue short-term securities, thereby putting more money in the stock market.
Positive and encouraging October 25, 2004
The CSRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) issue "The provisional measures for the administration of stock investments by insurance institutional investors," which allows insurance companies to participate in the "first-tier" (SHSE and SZSE) and "second-tier" markets, thereby putting more money in the market.
Positive and encouraging October 29, 2004
The CSRC increases interest rates. The CSRC issues temporary regulations on how listed corporations buy back their stock, thereby reducing the supply of stocks in the market.
Positive and encouraging June 24, 2005
The Chinese government reforms taxation on both interest and dividends: Any received from listed corporations will now be taxed at 50%.
Positive and encouraging April 28, 2006
The Chinese government increases interest rates. Negative June 27, 2006
The CIRC encourages insurance companies to directly or indirectly invest in the stock market.
Positive and encouraging July 22, 2006
The Chinese government increases interest rates. Negative August 25, 2006 The Chinese government reduces the required minimum amount for QFIIs in order to attract foreign insurance companies and fund management corporations with long-term investment goals. The policy advocated "protecting and developing the stock market" by increasing funds' access to the stock market and reducing the number of new shares issued, in order to move stock prices up. After this new policy went into effect, China implemented a series of new rules (see Table 2 ) with the intention of protecting the stock market. Institutions interpreted the new rules as a signal that China's regulators set a long-term goal of encouraging stock market growth.
Positive and encouraging
Given the dramatic policy shift, this study empirically investigates the role of 
Hypothesis development Hypothesis 1
The extant literature suggests that if some investors trade on a "noisy" signal that is not related to fundamentals, asset prices will deviate from their intrinsic value (DeLong et al., 1990; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002) . In addition to noise trader theory, prior studies explore the role of investor sentiment in market valuations and returns, and find that market returns causes future changes in sentiment. (Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Brown and Cliff, 2004 ). Brown and Cliff (2004) suggest that the strongest relationship exist between their measures on institutional sentiment and large stocks, thus further revealing that optimism is associated with overvaluation and low subsequent returns as the valuation level returns to its intrinsic value. One could argue that individual investors are less sophisticated and more risk averse than institutions, so the individual investor is the one who reacts and sells during a sharp market drop. Alternatively, it could be argued that institutional investors, although they are more sophisticated, have short horizons. In China's emerging market, individual investors are the majority group (often more than 80% of all trading volume; see Table 1B ). In such an emerging market, individual investors lack rational analytical capaci-
BOFIT-Institute for Economies in Transition Bank of Finland
BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/ 2012 17 ty and suffer from incomplete professional information, thus resulting in very noisy price.
Because the financial market is not efficient, high or depressed investor sentiment will lead to "prices [that] deviate substantially from fundamental values" (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003) . In contrast, institutional investors under certain circumstances can make rational decisions based on speculation.
If is an asymmetric pattern: the price sensitivity on trading volume is greater on market-up days than it is on market-down days. Also, the majority studies in the Chinese stock market find that the absolute value of price changes and the daily trading volume is positively correlated (Wang and Wu, 2001; Pan and Wu, 2004; Kong and Be, 2006) , and trading volume can only partly explain price fluctuations.
In summary, according to microeconomic theory, this study has attempted to use trading volume to examine whether institutional investors react strongly to large market price changes. If institutional investors panic on event-days and initiate more sells than buys, this could lead to the observed larger price movements for institutional investor dominated stocks. Here we investigate the relationship between turnover and ownership structure on the event-days. Using quarterly data for 1988 , Dennis and Strickland (2002 This study further investigates such relationships in the context of the role of government intervention. Karpoff (1987) , Copeland (1976) , and Jennings et al. (1981) pointed out an important association between stock prices and trading volume. If government intervention is effective in transitioning bearish markets into bullish markets, we would expect a more significant relationship between abnormal returns (turnover) and fund institutional holdings after the intervention. Therefore, we hypothesize that the enactment of the 2004 Regulation will enhance the relationship between institutional holdings and abnormal turnover.
Hypothesis 2: The association between institutional holdings and their abnormal turnover became more significant after the 2004 Regulation.
Data

Data sources
China's current stock market regulation requires every fund to report the total amount of all holdings semiannually and to report its top 10 security holdings (based on market value) at the end of each quarter. The discrepancies are noticeable. Sias (2007) points out that "given that lag returns and institutional ownership are directly observable, it is surprising that previous tests yield dramatically different conclusions." The study examines differences across studies and finds that four factors account for these discrepancies: (1) value-weighting versus 6 This method is similar to Dennis and Strickland (2002) . The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 requires institutional investors to report their portfolio holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on a quarterly basis via Form 13(f). The Act specifies that all institutions with discretion over $100 million or more in equity securities must report the contents of their holdings to the SEC. Outliers are a potential issue related to using value-weighted days. Because SHCI is a value-weighted index, very large returns for several big firms may generate large portfolio returns. As a result, on certain days the price changes do not reflect a broad market shift. To see if this occurred in our sample, we separately calculate the percentage of firms with positive returns, negative returns, and zero returns. In addition, we calculate the ratio of firms with positive returns to firms with negative returns on days when market returns exceeded 3%; we also calculate the ratio of firms with negative returns to firms with positive returns when market returns were less than -3%. On the three maximum days, all stocks moved up in the same direction. However, because Chinese regulations prohibit any company's stock price from moving by more than 10% from the previous day's closing price, 9 these extreme-event days do not properly reflect the effects of fund ownership on a firm's return. Therefore, we deleted these three days from the sample. After deleting these outliers, the Shanghai Composite Index's return on the largest "market-up" day (January 31, 2002) is 6.81%. The mean ratio of firms with positive returns to firms with negative returns on these up and down days is 95.24 and 34.67, respectively, with an overall mean of 70.75. These ratios are representative examples, reflecting most value-weighted positive or negative days in our samples.
They also indicate that outliers do not drive our results.
Meanwhile, from and Yu (2000), which finds that stock prices move together more in emerging markets with low-income economies, such as China and Poland, as compared to rich economies. This "synchronous" feature could be explained by imperfect market regulations and poor minority-investor protections in emerging markets. In Dennis and Strickland's (2002) study, for example, the ratio of the percentage of firms with positive returns to the percentage of firms with negative returns for these days had a sample mean of 2.8. In contrast, the mean of the ratios of our sample is 70.75. As in Table 3 , the mean of the ratios continually de- 
A Returns
The market portfolio is defined as the SHCI value-weighted Shanghai/Shenzhen portfolio. This table presents event-day sample descriptive statistics. The event day is defined as a trading day for which the absolute value of the market portfolio's return exceeds 3%. The market portfolio is defined as the SHCI value-weighted Shanghai/Shenzhen portfolio. The variables are size, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in Chinese RMB, fixed at about 6.9 RMB to U.S.$1) at the end of the quarter prior to the event day; turnover, which is daily volume expressed as a percentage of liquid shares outstanding on the event day; variance, which is the market-model residual variance for days [-250, -20] ; beta, which is computed using returns for days [-250, -20] for the SHCI index; ShareRatio, which is the percentage of a firm's liquid shares held by institutions; return, which is the firm's return on the event day; abnormal return, which is event-day market-adjusted return; and abnormal turnover, which is event-day turnover minus median turnover for days [-250, -20 ]. Levene's Test for Equality of Variances represents a rejection at the 1% level of equality of the statistic for the subsamples. BM is the book-to-market ratio at the end of quarter prior to the event day. Illiqudity is measured as the average across stocks of daily ratio of absolute stock return following Amihud's (2002) study. LagTurnover is measured as the turnover ratio at the end of quarter prior to the event day. Throughout this study, t refers to the event day when the absolute value of the market's return is greater than 3%. Return is a firm's return on the event day. Abnormal return is an event-day market-adjusted return, and abnormal turnover is an event-day turnover minus median turnover for days [-250, -20] . The independent variables in the regression analysis include: Size, defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of firm i at the end of the quarter prior to day t (in Chinese RMB, fixed at about 6.9 RMB to U.S.$1); Turnover, defined as the ratio of shares traded to liquid shares outstanding for firm i on day t; Var, defined as the variance of the market-model residual for firm i on day t for the period t-250 to t-20 days; Beta, defined as the beta of the firm's daily returns with the SHCI index for the period t-250 to t-20 days; and ShareRatio, defined as the percentage of a firm's liquid shares held by funds for firm i on day t. We calculate the minimum, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile, maximum, and standard deviation for each of the independent variables. Because the overall level of fund ownership increased during the sample period, we used a median split to partition firms into high and low subsamples of fund ownership for each extreme day. Table 4 compares abnormal returns between high-and low-fund-ownership portfolios. The mean (median) abnormal return for the whole fund-ownership portfolio is -0.4% (-0.4%). The mean (median) abnormal return for the low-fund-ownership portfolio is -0.5% (-0.4%), and the mean (median) abnormal return for the high-fund-ownership portfolio is -0.3% (-0.3%). This suggests that the higher the fund ownership, the lower the absolute value of abnormal returns and the closer the actual returns are to expected returns.
This in turn suggests that funds with more institutional holdings have higher returns, consistent with Gompers and Metrick (1998) . We performed a t-test and a simple sign test to determine if the means and medians for the high-and low-fund-ownership portfolios are equal. The equality of the means and medians is rejected at the 10% level.
10 Table 4 also shows that the high-fund-ownership portfolio with a lower raw return had a lower standard deviation during large "market-up" days, indicating a tighter clustering of returns. However, a high level of fund ownership and high standard deviations occurred on "market-down" days. The equality of the means and medians is rejected at the 5% level. The mean (median) fund ownership is 9.0% (5.5%) for the "up market" portfolio. The size statistics were consistent with Lakonishok et al. (1991) which finds that firms with high fund ownership are significantly larger than firms with low fund ownership. The statistics for variance and beta suggest that firms within the high-fund-ownership portfolio had lower idiosyncratic volatility and systematic risk. The equality of the idiosyncratic volatility means and medians is rejected at the 10% level.
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Finally, we calculate descriptive statistics for raw returns other than marketadjusted returns. Although we employ market-adjusted returns in the regressions, the pattern in event-day raw returns is more transparent than in abnormal returns. On "up" days the mean (median) raw return for the low-fund-ownership portfolio is 3.9% (3.6%) and the mean (median) return for the high-fund-ownership portfolio is 3.7% (3.4%). This suggests a lower actual return for the high-fund-ownership portfolio on "up" days. We perform a ttest and a simple sign test to determine if the means and medians for the high-and lowfund-ownership portfolios are equal. The equality of the means and medians is rejected at the 10% level. Moreover, the difference is approximately 20 basis points. There is no substantial cross-sectional variation in institutional holdings, which differs from the finding of Dennis and Strickland (2002) , possibly due to China's 10% limit on daily price changes.
When a large market drop occurred, however, high fund ownership was more likely to lead to high raw returns. The mean (median) return for the low-fund-ownership portfolio is -4.8% (-4.7%), and the mean (median) return for the high-fund-ownership portfolio is -4.4% (-4.3%). The equality of the means (medians) is rejected at the 5% level.
B Turnover
Trading volume may be one source of the relationship between event-day abnormal returns and fund ownership (Dennis and Strickland, 2002) . We therefore investigate the relationship between abnormal turnover and ownership structure on these event days.
As shown in Table 4 , the turnover for firms with high fund ownership is larger than the turnover for firms with low fund ownership on "up" days. This means that stocks with greater fund ownership were more liquid. However, on "down" days, for both turnover and abnormal turnover variables, we did not reject the equality of the means and medians at the 5% level. Although the differences in turnover and abnormal turnover for port- (1)
where the essential independent variable is ShareRatio (the level of fund ownership at the beginning of quarter t), which is used to investigate whether the cross-sectional distribution of market-adjusted returns is related to the level of fund ownership.
Model (1) analyzes the relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal returns because fund institutions were the largest group (70% of market value) of institutions in China. For example, on large "market-down" days, if institutions react more strongly than individual investors do, institutions sell more securities and consequently create a sharp drop in stock prices. Therefore, the higher the institutional ownership, the lower the abnormal returns. This leads to a negative relationship between abnormal returns and institutional ownership.
In contrast, on large "market-up" days, if institutions react more strongly than individuals do, we expect institutions to make large buying decisions and thus create a positive relationship between abnormal returns and institutional ownership. In a vein similar to Sias, Starks, and Titman (2001) , we hypothesize that increases in stock prices follow large institutional purchasing decisions. Consistent with Dennis and Strickland (2002) , size, In addition, other studies (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Connolly and Stivers, 2003) demonstrate that past trading volume can predict the magnitude and persistence of price momentum and return strategy. Similarly, Blume et al. (1994) find that past trading volume conveys valuable information about stock returns. Therefore, following Dennis and Strickland (2002) , we investigate institutional trading strategies from both abnormal-return and trading-volume models.
Furthermore, we examine the relationship between trading volume and fund ownership using Equation (2) with the same control variables as in Equation (1) 
where abnormal turnover ( it AT ) is defined as the turnover for firm i less the median turnover for days [-250, -20] . Using abnormal turnover as the dependent variable is consistent with the notion that stocks with a high trading volume normally have a high turnover on event days. The independent variables in Model (2) are the same as those in Equation (1).
Again, we use the Petersen's (2009) method to control for the time-series independence for a given stock across years. To take a look at the relationship between the level of fund ownership and abnormal returns, we ran the regression by dividing the sample into two periods, the preintervention period (2001) (2002) (2003) and the postintervention period (2004) (2005) (2006) , on both "market-up" and "market-down" days in Table 5 . 2001-2003 and 2004-2006 This table contains coefficient estimates from pooled, time-series, cross-sectional regressions using the following model:
The dependent variable is the event-day market-adjusted abnormal return. The event day is defined as a trading day on which the absolute value of the market portfolio's return exceeds 3%. The market portfolio is defined as the SHCI value-weighted Shanghai/Shenzhen portfolio. The independent variables are size, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in Chinese RMB, fixed at about 6.9 RMB to U.S.$1) for the quarter prior to the event day; turnover ,which is daily volume expressed as a percentage of liquid shares outstanding on the event day; Var, which is the market-model residual variance for days [-250, -20] ; beta which is computed using returns for days [-250, -20] for the SHCI index; ShareRatio, which is the percentage of a firm's liquid shares held by funds; and SRChange ,which is the change in fund ownership from the beginning to the end of each quarter. BM is the book-to-market ratio at the end of quarter prior to the event day. Illiqudity is measured as the average across stocks of daily ratio of absolute stock return following Amihud's (2002) study. 27.14% 9.49% * , ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Table 5 2006. This suggests that fund institutions were still optimistic about a large drop in bullish markets, consistent with prior studies (Lipson and Puckett, 2007) . We find a positive relationship between the level of fund ownership and abnormal returns in the postintervention period, consistent with our hypothesis.
Taken together, institutions conducted opposite trading strategies between the preintervention and postintervention period when the market was rising. This provides evidence that China's government intervention was effective, consistent with our hypothesis.
Abnormal Turnover
To evaluate the relationship between fund ownership and abnormal turnover, Table 6 In the preintervention period, the coefficient on fund ownership is significant and positive (0.03***) on down days, but insignificant on up days. However, the coefficient on the change in fund ownership is insignificant on both up and down days. As a result, institutions generated abnormal turnover on "market-down" days before the 2004 Regulation. Nevertheless, the coefficients of fund ownership changed to significantly negative (-0.02*** and -0.05***) on extreme marketmovement days (up and down, respectively), and the coefficients of the change in fund ownership were negative (-0.04*** and -0.06***) on both up and down days after the intervention. This indicates that the higher proportion held by fund institutions, the less likely for institutions to sell in a bullish market. In contrast, the lower proportion held by fund institutions, the more likely for individual investors to sell. This indicates that institutions did not generate abnormal turnover; rather, individual investors in volatile markets did. The dependent variable AT is the event-day abnormal turnover, defined as the turnover for firm i on day t less the median turnover for days [-250, -20] . The event day is defined as a trading day on which the absolute value of the market portfolio's return exceeds 3%. The market portfolio is defined as the SHCI valueweighted Shanghai/Shenzhen portfolio. The independent variables are size, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in Chinese RMB, fixed at about 6.9 RMB to U.S.$1) for the quarter prior to the event day; turnover, which is daily volume expressed as a percentage of liquid shares outstanding on the event day; Var, which is the market-model residual variance for days [-250, -20] ; beta, which is computed using returns for days [-250, -20] for the SHCI index; ShareRatio, which is the percentage of a firm's liquid shares held by funds; and SRChange, which is the change in fund ownership from the beginning to the end of each quarter. LagTurnover is measured as the turnover ratio at the end of quarter prior to the event day. Overall, we observed a negative relationship between abnormal turnover and fund ownership in the postintervention period, inconsistent with our hypothesis 2. This could be explained by the fact that the majority of China's stock market participants were individual investors during our sample period. As mentioned, irrational individual trading in response Table 7 ). By using an indirect method, we can attribute this finding to enhanced irrational trading behavior from individual investors (who compose nearly 80% of all trading volume, as mentioned earlier) in China's emerging stock market. That is to say, a sharp drop in individual trading occurred during bearish markets, whereas individual trading dramatically increased during bullish markets. This is a common characteristic of other emerging markets as well.
Overall, our results provide evidence that the Chinese government's intervention in 2004 was effective in rescuing bearish markets, rebuilding fund institutions' confidence in the stock market, and tempering their reaction to new regulatory policies.
Robustness tests
T-tests on the Means of Abnormal Return and Turnover around Government Intervention
To maintain consistency with our hypotheses, we also conducted t-tests for both abnormal returns and abnormal turnover during the preintervention and the postintervention periods. The results are shown in Table 7B . We find that annual abnormal return differs significantly by year, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Finally, as expected, the difference in the means of abnormal turnover is significant at the 0.1% level (see Table 7A ). The means of abnormal turnover in the postintervention period (2004) (2005) (2006) were larger than those in the preintervention period (2001) (2002) (2003) for both up (1.818% versus 0.91%) and down (3.043% versus 0.286%) days, which is consistent with our hypothesis.
Supplementing the pooled multivariate regression results reported earlier, Table 8 shows the results of the regression models we conduct for each year. Panel A of Table 8 shows that the coefficients of fund ownership in the abnormal return regressions significantly shifted from negative to positive on up days from the preintervention to the postintervention period. This indicates that using 2004 as a turnaround point on an ex-post basis is a valid and effective method to test the role of government intervention after considering the changes in regulatory policies. Overall, we find that government intervention was effective in improving China's stock market and that it succeeded in turning bearish markets into bullish markets. We also find that institutions are more sensitive and react more quickly than individual investors.
In addition, because abnormal turnover showed the right skewness feature (Table   4) , we rerun both equations (1) and (2) after removing the top 1% from the final sample.
We have omitted the tabulated results from this study for the sake of brevity, but they are qualitatively the same as the findings reported here.
Besides the event dates, we conducted sensitivity tests on all trading days. We For the regressions of abnormal returns and average turnover on all trading days, we used Shareratio at the end of each quarter t, which is consistent with prior studies (Gibson and Safieddine, 2003; Badrinath and Wahal, 2002; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Falkenstein, 1996) , which is different from Model (1) and (2). Also, since we used the end-ofquarter Shareratio for this additional analysis, we removed SRChange from Model (1) and (2) in the robustness tests for all trading days tests.
Table 9 Abnormal Return Regressions on All Trading Days
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted abnormal returns at the end of each quarter t. The market portfolio is defined as the SHCI value-weighted Shanghai/Shenzhen portfolio. The independent variables are size, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in Chinese RMB, fixed at about 6.9 RMB to U.S.$1) at the beginning of quarter t; turnover, which is daily volume trading expressed as a percentage of liquid shares outstanding; Var, which is the market-model residual variance for days [-250, -20] ; beta which is computed using returns for days [-250, -20] for the SHCI index; ShareRatio, which is a firm's liquid shares held by funds at the end of quarter t. BM is the book-to-market ratio at the end of quarter prior to the event day. Illiqudity is measured as the average across stocks of daily ratio of absolute stock return following Amihud's (2002) study. [2001] [2002] [2003] . This supports our decision to use event days rather than all trading days to investigate the impact of government intervention on institutional trading strategy.
Also, the relationship between the level of fund ownership and abnormal returns is significant and positive (0.21***) on "down" days during [2001] [2002] [2003] . This indicates that the fund did not sell when the market fell sharply in order to avoid the larger amount of reduction in the net value of stocks. Considering the mutual fund redemptions in China, which are significantly higher than those in the U.S. market (Yao and Liu, 2004; Lu, 2007) Turnover is daily trading volume expressed as a percentage of liquid shares outstanding for each quarter. The independent variables are size, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in Chinese RMB, fixed at about 6.9 RMB to U.S.$1) at the beginning of quarter t; Var, which is the market-model residual variance for days [-250, -20] ; and ShareRatio, which is a firm's liquid shares held by funds at the end of quarter t. LagTurnover is measured as the turnover ratio at the end of quarter prior to the event day. * , ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Moreover, turnover ratio is defined as the average daily turnover ratio, not abnormal turnover ratio used in model (2), because we cannot compute abnormal turnovers for each quarter. Instead we use the average in daily trading volume for each quarter. Also we use the end-of-quarter ShareRatio, not the beginning-of-quarter ShareRatio to measure the fund ownership. We examine the relationship between average daily turnovers and fund ownership with the same control variables, as in Equation (2) without SRChange. Table 10 presents quarter. This is also verified from another point of view: whether it is sharply rising on an event-day or a quarter in a bull market, the market's trading volume mainly comes from individual investors. However, when the market falls sharply in trading days in a bull market, individual investors panic and sell, whereas institutions do not sell. This is why the proportion of institutional holdings and trading volume is negative correlated (-0.05*** in Table 6 ). When the market quarterly declines in a bull market, institutions will substantially purchase, resulting in a positive correlation (0.32*** in Table 10 ). These results do not support Hypothesis 2. Nevertheless, it reflects that when the market moved down dra- 
